Abstract. We consider perfect verifiable secret sharing (VSS) in a synchronous network of n processors (players) where a designated player called the dealer wishes to distribute a secret s among the players in a way that no t of them obtain any information, but any t + 1 players obtain full information about the secret. The round complexity of a VSS protocol is defined as the number of rounds performed in the sharing phase. Gennaro, Ishai, Kushilevitz and Rabin showed that three rounds are necessary and sufficient when n > 3t. Sufficiency, however, was only demonstrated by means of an inefficient (i.e., exponential-time) protocol, and the construction of an efficient three-round protocol was left as an open problem. In this paper, we present an efficient three-round protocol for VSS. The solution is based on a three-round solution of so-called weak verifiable secret sharing (WSS), for which we also prove that three rounds is a lower bound. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that one round is sufficient for WSS when n > 4t, and that VSS can be achieved in 1 + ε amortized rounds (for any ε > 0) when n > 3t.
Introduction
Secret sharing [2, 9] is one of the most important primitives used for the construction of secure multi-party protocols. In secret sharing, a "dealer" wants to share a secret s among a set of n players such that no set of t players will be able to reconstruct the secret while any set of t + 1 or more players will be able to reconstruct the secret by combining their shares.
Verifiable secret sharing [4] (VSS) extends ordinary secret sharing for the use in presence of active corruption where an adversary may corrupt up to t players in an arbitrary way. In VSS, it is required that no t players get any information about the secret whereas the n players together can reliably reconstruct the secret even if t of them deliver wrong information.
Prior work. Secret sharing was introduced in [2, 9] together with a perfectly secure solution for any number n > t of players in the presence of passive corruption, i.e., where no t players get any Shannon information about secret s and any t + 1 players get full information about s.
On the other hand, perfectly secure VSS is (efficiently) achievable if and only if n > 3t [1] . When additionally given a broadcast channel among the players, unconditionally secure VSS (with negligible error) can be achieved if n > 2t [8] . As a building block for the VSS protocol in [8] , a "degraded" variant of VSS is introduced called weak verifiable secret sharing (WSS), where the reconstructed value may also be some default value, in case the dealer is corrupted.
VSS has been extensively studied. Of relevance to our work is the study of the problem's round complexity by Gennaro, Ishai, Kushilevitz and Rabin [5] , who give tight bounds for perfectly secure VSS. Specifically, it is shown that for n > 4t one round is sufficient when t = 1 and that two rounds is a tight bound for general t. For the optimal n > 3t, it is shown that three rounds is sufficient as well as necessary; the protocol achieving it, however, requires exponential time. The existence of efficient three-round protocols was left as an open problem.
Our contributions. In this paper, we solve this open problem by presenting an efficient three-round protocol for VSS perfectly secure for n > 3t. The solution is based on a three-round protocol for WSS which we demonstrate to be round optimal itself, by first showing three-round optimality of a problem that we call weak secure multicast (WSM), and then showing a reduction to WSS. Furthermore, we show that perfectly secure WSS is efficiently achievable in one round when n > 4t (and t > 1). Finally, we present a simple protocol for perfectly secure VSS with amortized 1 + ε rounds for any ε > 0 when n > 3t -which is of special interest for secure multi-party computation [1, 3] , where a large number of VSS protocols are run sequentially.
Organization of the paper. We start in Section 2 by presenting the model and definitions of the secret sharing problems we are considering. Section 3 is dedicated to WSS, where we present round-optimal protocols for the cases n > 3t and n > 4t. We derive the efficient round-optimal and player-optimal protocol for VSS in Section 4. The amortized (1+ε)-round protocol is described in Section 5. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 6. For ease of readability, the round optimality proof for player-optimal WSS based on WSM is presented in the appendix.
Model and Definitions
We assume a set P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } of n players including dealer D, say, D = P 1 , and assume the standard model of a fully connected network of pairwise secure channels, plus a common broadcast channel, which can be used to force a player to send the same message to all the other players. Furthermore, we assume the presence of an active adversary who may corrupt up to t of the players in an arbitrarily malicious way. Such a corrupted player is called dishonest whereas an uncorrupted player is called honest. The adversary is modeled to be rushing (i.e., it can base the dishonest players' messages for round r on the honest players' messages of the same round), adaptive (the adversary can adaptively corrupt players as the protocol proceeds), but non-mobile (over the whole period, the adversary corrupts at most t different players). We call such an adversary a "tadversary." We demand perfect security, i.e., that the resulting protocol has zero error and that no Shannon information is leaked to the adversary.
We consider several forms of secret sharings with different security properties. As in [5] , the protocols for all of them have the same following two-phase structure: In a primary phase, the dealer D distributes a secret s, while in a second, later phase, the players cooperate in order to retrieve it. More specifically, the structure is as follows:
Sharing phase: The dealer initially holds secret s ∈ K where K is a finite field of sufficient size; and each player P i finally holds some private information v i (possibly consisting of several field elements). Reconstruction phase: In this phase, each player P i reveals (some of) his private information v i . Then, on the revealed information v i (a dishonest player may reveal v i = v i ), a reconstruction function is applied in order to compute the secret,
The sharing phase as well as the reconstruction phase may consist of several communication rounds. We model communication along the lines of [5] where, in each round, a player can privately send messages to other players and/or broadcast a message to all players. With respect to this model, the round complexity of a secret-sharing protocol is defined as the number of such communication rounds that the protocol requires in the sharing phase.
Common requirements. The following requirements have to be satisfied by all secret-sharing protocols we discuss in this paper.
Privacy: If D is honest, then the adversary's view during the sharing phase reveals no information about s. More formally, the adversary's view is identically distributed under all different values of s. Correctness: If D is honest, then the reconstructed value is equal to the secret s.
Depending on the particular "strength" of the secret-sharing protocol, different commitment properties are required.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS). An n-player protocol is called a (perfect) (n, t)-VSS protocol if, for any t-adversary, the following condition holds in addition to the privacy and correctness conditions:
Commitment: After the sharing phase, a unique value s * is determined which will be reconstructed in the reconstruction phase; i.e., s * = Rec(v 1 , · · · , v n ) regardless of the views provided by the dishonest players.
Weak verifiable secret sharing (WSS). An n-player protocol is called a (perfect) (n, t)-WSS protocol if, for any t-adversary, the following condition holds in addition to the privacy and correctness conditions:
Weak commitment: After the sharing phase there is a unique value s * ∈ K such that either s * or default value ⊥ / ∈ K will be reconstructed in the reconstruction phase; i.e., Rec(v 1 , · · · , v n ) ∈ {⊥, s * } regardless of the views provided by the dishonest players.
Round complexity and efficiency. As in [5] , we define the round complexity of a secret-sharing protocol as the number of communication rounds in its sharing phase -reconstruction can always be done in a single round by having each player reveal all the information he has. A VSS protocol is efficient if the total computation and communication performed by all honest players is polynomial in n and the size of the secret.
Round-Optimal WSS
We begin by giving a three-round (n, t)-WSS protocol for n > 3t, which is optimal, followed by a one-round (n, t)-WSS protocol for n > 4t.
Round-optimal WSS for n > 3t
The protocol is based on the four-round (n, t)-VSS protocol for n > 3t given in [5] ; essentially, it consists of that protocol's first three rounds, with a modified reconstruction phase. Unlike the protocol in [5] , where inconsistencies between the shares of honest players are eliminated by using error correcting codes, we use a different technique to detect the dishonest players who deliver false information in the reconstruction phase.
We now present the protocol. The secret s is assumed to be taken from a finite field K, |K| > n; additionally, 1, 2, ..., n are interpreted as (arbitrary) distinct non-zero field elements. We call this protocol ( Sharing phase: The sharing phase consists of the following three rounds:
1. D chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ K[x, y] of degree at most t in each variable, satisfying F (0, 0) = s. D sends to each player P i the (univariate) polynomials f i (x) = F (x, i) and g i (y) = F (i, y). Player P i sends to each player P j an independent random "pad" r ij picked uniformly from K.
2.
Player P i broadcasts:
For each pair a ij = b ji , the following happens:
A player is said to be unhappy if the value which he broadcast does not match the dealer's value. If there are more than t unhappy players, disqualify the dealer and stop. Reconstruction phase: Every happy player P i broadcasts his polynomials
Each player P i now constructs a consistency graph G over the set of happy players such that there exists an edge between P j and P k in G if and only if f j (k) = g k (j) and g j (k) = f k (j). Since these polynomials are broadcast, every player P i constructs the same graph G. Now each player P i constructs a set CORE of players as follows. Initially, all the players in G whose node degree is at least n − t are inserted into the set. Next, players in CORE consistent with less than n − t other players in CORE are removed. This process continues until no more players can be removed from the set. If the resulting CORE set contains less than n − t elements then P i outputs ⊥ -otherwise, P i reconstructs the polynomial F * (x, y) defined by any t + 1 players in CORE , and the secret s * = F * (0, 0) is reconstructed. That finishes the description of protocol ( n 3 )-WSS. We now show that it is a (n, t)-WSS protocol for n > 3t.
As suggested by the construction of graph G above, we say that (the polynomials of) two players P i and P j are consistent if the corresponding values of their polynomials (as opened in the reconstruction phase) match, i.e., if f i (j) = g j (i) and g i (j) = f j (i). Similarly, we say a player P i is consistent with bivariate polynomial F (x, y) if f i (x) and g i (y) lie on F (x, y), i.e., f i (x) = F (x, i) and g i (y) = F (i, y). We first prove the following about players in CORE . Lemma 1. If |CORE | ≥ n − t, then all the players in CORE are consistent with a polynomial fixed at the end of the sharing phase.
Proof. At the end of the sharing phase, all the honest happy players are consistent with each other and their shares define a unique bivariate polynomial F H (x, y) with degree at most t in both variables. To be in CORE , every player P i must be consistent with (at least) n − t players in CORE . Moreover, every player in CORE is happy. So there are at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest players in CORE with whom P i is consistent. These t + 1 players define a unique polynomial f i (x) of degree at most t for P i , which is in turn consistent with F H (x, y). Thus, the polynomial provided by P i must be f i (x). Therefore, every player in CORE is consistent with F H (x, y).
Proof. Number of rounds and efficiency are evident. We prove the WSS properties in turn.
Privacy: We only need to consider the case when D is honest. Since D distributes consistent information, any pair P i and P j of honest players publishes the same mutual padded values. Thus, due to the randomness of the pads, the adversary's view is indistinguishable under different secrets. Correctness: If D is honest then all (at least n − t) honest players will be happy, and D will not be disqualified in the sharing phase. Since all honest players are mutually consistent, they all end up in set CORE whereas a dishonest player can only be in CORE by revealing his correct polynomials. Thus the information revealed by the players in CORE is consistent with polynomial F and s * = F * (0, 0) = F (0, 0) = s is reconstructed. Weak commitment: We need only consider the case when D is dishonest. If |CORE | < n − t then all the players compute s * = ⊥ and weak commitment is satisfied. On the other hand, consider |CORE | ≥ n − t. In this case, it directly follows from Lemma 1 that the secret constructed is the free term of F H (x, y).
We now state a property of the above protocol which will be used in the correctness proof for our VSS protocol in the next section.
Lemma 2. If the dealer is not disqualified in the reconstruction phase of ( n 3 )-WSS, then the polynomial F * (x, y) reconstructed in that phase is consistent with all the honest happy players.
Proof. As proved in Lemma 1, the polynomial reconstructed at the end of the reconstruction phase is F H (x, y). This F H (x, y) is defined as the polynomial constructed by any t + 1 honest happy players. Thus the polynomial constructed is consistent with all the honest happy players.
Round optimality. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. For n ≤ 4t (t > 1), there is no perfect (n, t)-WSS protocol requiring less than three rounds.
Round-optimal WSS for n > 4t
When n > 4t, perfectly secure WSS can be efficiently achieved in one round as follows.
Sharing phase: D chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ K[x, y] of degree at most t in each variable satisfying F (0, 0) = s and sends to each player P i the polynomials f i (x) = F (x, i) and g i (y) = F (i, y).
Reconstruction phase: Player P i broadcasts the polynomials F (x, i) and F (i, y) he received in the sharing phase. Player P i constructs a consistency graph G and a set CORE as in protocol ( n 3 )-WSS. Finally, if |CORE | < n − t, P i computes ⊥; otherwise, s * = F * (0, 0), where F * (0, 0) is the unique bivariate polynomial of degree at most t in both variables defined by any t + 1 players in CORE .
Theorem 3. Perfectly secure WSS is efficiently achievable in one round when n > 4t.
Proof. We prove that the above protocol achieves the three conditions of WSS.
Privacy: Privacy is obvious since the adversary only gets information about at most t players' shares. Correctness: If the dealer D is honest then he sends correct shares to all the players. Thus, at the end of the reconstruction phase, set CORE contains (at least) n − t honest players, D is not disqualified, and the secret s is reconstructed since any other secret s * can be consistent with at most 2t < n − t players. Weak commitment: We need only consider the case when D is dishonest. If |CORE | < n − t, then all the players compute ⊥ and weak commitment is satisfied. On the other hand, assume that |CORE | ≥ n − t. This implies that there is a set C of at least n − 2t consistent honest players defining a unique secret s * . Out of set C at most t players can be consistent with a polynomial defining a different secret s = s * . Thus at most |P \C|+t ≤ n−(n−2t)+t = 3t < n − t players overall can be consistent with secret s -implying weak commitment on s * .
Round-Optimal VSS for n > 3t
We now present an efficient three-round (n, t)-VSS protocol for n > 3t. Its round optimality follows from the lower bound in [5] . We first give some of the intuition behind our protocol. Overall, we follow the approach in [5] (and in the previous section), where the dealer first hides the secret in a bivariate polynomial F (x, y), and each player P i gets the respective univariate polynomials F (x, i) and F (i, y) as his secret information. Then, every pair of players compare their common shares by "blinding" them with a random pad and then broadcasting them. In the reconstruction phase the random pads are revealed, allowing the players to compute the shares and finally reconstruct the secret. However, our twist is as follows. In order to guarantee that each player P i 's random pads get revealed consistently, P i shares a random field element using a round-optimal, player-optimal (n, t)-WSS protocol -namely, protocol ( n 3 )-WSS from the previous section, and chooses his pads as points on the respective polynomial, as opposed to independently at random as in [5] and in the previous section for WSS. Players whose ( n 3 )-WSS protocol instance fails, also get disqualified from the main protocol; on the other hand, players whose protocol instance succeeds enable the reconstruction of all the pads, and in turn the computation of the main shares. Using these multiple instances of an (n, t)-WSS protocol also replaces the need for explicit error correcting codes, as required by some of the VSS protocols (the efficient ones) in [5] .
We now present our VSS protocol in detail. We will use superscript "W" to denote the quantities corresponding to the ( n 3 )-WSS protocols that are run in order to WSS the players' random pads. We call the resulting VSS protocol (
Sharing phase: The sharing phase consists of the following three rounds:
Dealer D chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ K [x, y] of degree at most t in each variable satisfying F (0, 0) = s. D sends to P i the polynomials f i (x) = F (x, i) and g i (y) = F (i, y). Player P i , i = 1, . . . , n, selects a random value r i and starts an instance of ( Player P i broadcasts the following:
For each pair a ij = b ji the following happens:
. . , n, also takes place. A player is said to be unhappy if the value that he broadcast does not match the dealer's value. If there are more than t unhappy players, disqualify D and stop.
Local computation:
Let H denote the set of happy players. Remove from H each player P i who gets disqualified as the dealer in protocol instance ( Reconstruction phase: For each P i ∈ CORE Sh , run the reconstruction phase of ( n 3 )-WSS i , concurrently. Local computation: Now each player P i constructs a set CORE Rec as follows. Initially, CORE Rec := CORE Sh .
Remove from CORE Rec every player P i such that the outcome of (
For every P i ∈ CORE Rec , use the values a ij he broadcast in round two of the sharing phase to compute
Interpolate these points. Check that the resulting polynomial f i (x) is a polynomial of degree at most t. If not, remove P i from CORE Rec . Reconstruct the secret by taking any t+1 polynomials f i (x), P i ∈ CORE Rec , to obtain F * (x, y), and compute s * = F * (0, 0).
Lemma 3. If D is honest, then CORE Sh contains all the honest players.
Proof. First, since D is honest, all honest players are happy with respect to F (x, y). Thus, initially, H contains all the honest players. Similarly, the set of happy players corresponding to ( n 3 )-WSS i started by a honest player P i will contain all the honest players. Thus |H W i | ≥ n − t and all the honest players will be in H. Also, since all honest players are mutually consistent, an honest player P i is consistent with n − t players in H and thus P i ∈ CORE Sh . Lemma 4. If D does not get disqualified in the sharing phase then all the honest players in CORE Sh are consistent with each other and, when |CORE Sh | ≥ n−t, consistently define a unique polynomial F H (x, y) of degree at most t in each variable. Furthermore, when D is honest, F H (x, y) = F (x, y).
Proof. Since the honest players use their pads faithfully there are no inconsistencies between honest players in CORE Sh . Furthermore, if |CORE Sh | ≥ n−t, then there are at least t + 1 honest players in CORE Sh defining a unique polynomial F H (x, y). Finally, in case the dealer is honest, it holds that F H (x, y) = F (x, y).
Lemma 5. If D does not get disqualified in the sharing phase then, at the end of the reconstruction phase, there are at least t + 1 honest players in CORE Rec .
Proof. In the reconstruction phase a player P i gets removed from CORE Rec in only two cases: 1) the reconstruction phase of ( n 3 )-WSS i results in ⊥, or 2) the reconstruction phase of ( n 3 )-WSS i succeeds but the resulting polynomial f i (x) is of degree larger than t. By the properties of WSS, both cannot happen with respect to a honest player, and thus at least n−2t > t honest players in CORE Sh remain in CORE Rec .
Lemma 6. If D does not get disqualified in the sharing phase, then any t + 1 players in CORE Rec define the same bivariate polynomial.
Proof. If a dishonest player P i remains in CORE Rec , then the reconstruction phase of ( Proof (sketch). We only have to consider the case when D is honest. The number of rounds and polynomial-time computation are immediate. We prove the three VSS properties in turn.
Privacy: Assume that, at the end of the reconstruction phase, the players in A ⊂ P, |A| ≤ t, are corrupted. Let View
, denote the adversary's view after step k of the sharing phase. Note that, for all P a ∈ A, the polynomials F W a (x, y) are exclusively used in order to blind values already known to the adversary, and therefore we can ignore these polynomials. After step 2 of the sharing phase, the adversary holds (at most) the following polynomials: F (x, a), F (a, y), F W i (x, a), and F W i (a, y), and it holds that, for all = log |K|; hence, privacy follows. Correctness: We only consider the case when D is honest. By Lemma 3, all the honest players will be in CORE Sh , thus |CORE Sh | ≥ n − t, and the dealer is not disqualified in the sharing phase. By Lemma 4, the shares of the honest players in CORE Sh define the dealer's original polynomial F H (x, y) = F (x, y). Obviously, all honest players remain in CORE Rec , and by Lemma 6, s = F (0, 0) gets reconstructed from the shares of any t + 1 players in CORE Rec . Commitment: If D is dishonest and does not get disqualified in the sharing phase, then |CORE Sh | ≥ n−t and, by Lemma 5, at least t+1 honest players from CORE Sh remain in CORE Rec . By Lemma 4, all honest players in CORE Sh consistently define the same polynomial F H (x, y) after the sharing phase. Thus, the t + 1 honest players in CORE Sh ∩ CORE Rec still uniquely define F H (x, y) and, by Lemma 6, s * = F H (0, 0) gets reconstructed from the shares of any t + 1 players in CORE Rec .
VSS in (1 + ε) Rounds
Depending on the particular application, minimizing the round complexity of a stand-alone protocol might not always be the best way to optimize. In multiparty computation, for example, where a large number of VSS protocols are executed sequentially, it is useful to minimize the overall amortized round complexity of the VSS instances.
A number m of sequential (n, t)-VSS executions can be easily achieved in 1 + O( 1 m ) amortized rounds by "deferring" the commitment as follows. Suppose we have a k−round (n, t)-VSS protocol, and we need to execute m instances of it. In an initial phase, dealer D (or all future dealers in the application, respectively) shares (in parallel) a set of random elements r 1 , . . . , r m using the given (n, t)-VSS protocol. The sharing phase of the j-th execution of the (n, t)-VSS protocol, j = 1, . . . , m then simply consists of the dealer broadcasting a correction term c j = s j − r j , where s j is the secret to be shared in this instance. The correction term c j can be handled in two different ways:
c j is incorporated in the reconstruction phase. That is, after the reconstruction of random element r j , each player locally computes s j = r j + c j ; or 2.
the sharing is immediately "corrected" at the end of the sharing phase, by having every player P i compute F k (x, i) = F k (x, i) + c k and F k (i, y) = F k (i, y) + c k .
Theorem 5. Any number m of sequential VSS protocols for n > 3t is efficiently achievable in m + 2 rounds, thus implying 1 + ε amortized rounds per instance for any ε > 0 when m is sufficiently large.
Proof. Using any k-round (n, t)-VSS protocol the above approach results in m + k − 1 rounds overall, or 1 + k−1 m rounds per VSS. In particular, using the roundoptimal protocol from Section 4 results in 1 + 2 m rounds per VSS instance. Thus, in order to achieve 1 + ε amortized rounds, it is sufficient to choose m ≥ 2 ε .
Summary
In this paper we gave efficient three-round protocols for perfectly secure WSS and VSS when n > 3t, and showed that there is no (n, t)-WSS protocol involving less than three rounds when n ≤ 4t. Furthermore, we gave an efficient one-round protocol for perfectly secure WSS when n > 4t, and demonstrated that perfectly secure VSS can be achieved in (1 + ε) rounds when n > 3t.
The following table summarizes the tight bounds on the round complexity of perfectly secure WSS and VSS as given in [5] and in this paper -where round optimality is always achieved efficiently. ("-" stands for impossibility.) Protocol Threshold Number of rounds n ≤ 3t -WSS 3t < n ≤ 4t 3 4t < n 1 n ≤ 3t -VSS 3t < n ≤ 4t 3 4t < n (t > 1) 2 4t < n (t = 1) 1
Note that, same as some (but not all) of the protocols in [5] , although our solution for VSS fulfills the standard VSS definition, it is not powerful enough to allow for general multi-party computation. In particular, multiplication of shared secrets is not directly possible since the sharing phase of two different VSS invocations may end up in different CORE Sh sets.
Furthermore, note that, also as the protocols in [5] , our VSS protocol satisfies the stronger VSS definition in [7] (Definition 3.3.13) requiring that any set of t + 1 honest players be able to reconstruct the shared secret. This condition is satisfied because any set of t + 1 honest players can reconstruct the WSS-shared secrets of all players in CORE Sh .
Finally, it can be easily seen that our protocols also work with respect to a (possibly corrupted) external dealer while still tolerating t corrupted players among the "share holders."
